Inaugural editorial.

The commencement of a new editorial tenure within the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition (JPSP: ASC) provides an opportunity for reflection regarding the journal's core mission. The editors recognize that social psychology is at a crossroads due to competing demands that may have led to reduced submissions and posed challenges for previous editors in filling the journal's pages. Now, JPSP: ASC has been allotted more pages to allow for growth during this editorial term. Although this is desirable for the field, it adds to the pressure of identifying articles for publication given the difficulties filling the pages during previous editorial terms. As the premier outlet of social psychology since 1965, JPSP: ASC will retain its centrality if we increase submissions and publish more articles, while continuing to strive to communicate methodologically trustworthy, intellectually stimulating, and socially relevant research, in a responsible fashion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Bullshit can be harmful to your health: Bullibility as a precursor to poor decision--making.

Bullshitting is characterized by sharing information with little to no regard for truth, established knowledge, or genuine evidence. It involves the use of various rhetorical strategies to make one's statements sound knowledgeable, impressive, persuasive, influential, or confusing in order to aid bullshitters in explaining things in areas where their obligations to provide opinions exceed their actual knowledge in those domains. Distinct from gullibility (i.e., a propensity to accept a false premise in the presence of untrustworthiness cues), we highlight the research on bullibility (i.e., believing bullshit even in the face of social cues that signal something is bullshit) and its links to erroneous judgments and decisions. A deeper understanding of bullibility is critical to identifying and correcting poor decision-making.

Bullshitting and persuasion: The persuasiveness of a disregard for the truth.

Although generally viewed as a common and undesirable social behaviour, very little is known about the nature of bullshitting (i.e., communicating with little to no regard for evidence or truth; Raritan Q Rev 6, 1986, 81); its consequences; and its potential communicative utility. Specifically, it is hypothesized that bullshitting may be may be relatively influential under specified conditions. Experiment 1 participants were exposed to a traditional persuasion paradigm, receiving either strong or weak arguments in either an evidence-based or bullshit frame. Experiment 2 also incorporated a manipulation of a peripheral route cue (i.e., source attractiveness). Findings demonstrate that bullshitting can be an effective means of influence when arguments are weak, yet undermine persuasive attempts when arguments are strong. Results also suggest that bullshit frames may cue peripheral route processing of persuasive information relative to evidence-based frames that appear to cue central route processing. Results are discussed in light of social perception and attitude change.

How Communication "Failed" or "Saved the Day": Counterfactual Accounts of Medical Errors.

Communication breakdowns among clinicians, patients, and family members can lead to medical errors, yet effective communication may prevent such mistakes. This investigation examined patients' and family members' experiences where they believed communication failures contributed to medical errors or where effective communication prevented a medical error ("close calls"). The study conducted a thematic analysis of open-ended responses to an online survey of patients' and family members' past experiences with medical errors or close calls. Of the 93 respondents, 56 (60%) provided stories of medical errors, and the remaining described close calls. Two predominant themes emerged in medical error stories that were attributed to health care providers-information inadequacy (eg, delayed, inaccurate) and not listening to or being dismissive of a patient's or family member's concerns. In stories of close calls, a patient's or family member's proactive communication (eg, being assertive, persistent) most often "saved the day." The findings highlight the importance of encouraging active patient/family involvement in a patient's medical care to prevent errors and of improving systems to provide meaningful information in a timely manner.

Emotion Decoding and Incidental Processing Fluency as Antecedents of Attitude Certainty.

Previous research demonstrates that attitude certainty influences the degree to which an attitude changes in response to persuasive appeals. In the current research, decoding emotions from facial expressions and incidental processing fluency, during attitude formation, are examined as antecedents of both attitude certainty and attitude change. In Experiment 1, participants who decoded anger or happiness during attitude formation expressed their greater attitude certainty, and showed more resistance to persuasion than participants who decoded sadness. By manipulating the emotion decoded, the diagnosticity of processing fluency experienced during emotion decoding, and the gaze direction of the social targets, Experiment 2 suggests that the link between emotion decoding and attitude certainty results from incidental processing fluency. Experiment 3 demonstrated that fluency in processing irrelevant stimuli influences attitude certainty, which in turn influences resistance to persuasion. Implications for appraisal-based accounts of attitude formation and attitude change are discussed.

The Sin of Prediction: When Mentally Simulated Alternatives Compete With Reality.

Experiential and associative learning are essential to optimal decision making. However, research shows that, even when exposed to repeated trials, people often fail to learn probabilities and cause/effect covariations. Consistent with the counterfactual inflation hypothesis, it is proposed that counterfactuals can interfere with memory of repeated exposures and therefore inhibit learning. Five experimental studies tested counterfactual thinking as a potential mechanism underlying this learning deficit using a simple, biased coin flipping paradigm. Participants were instructed to either simply observe or to predict and observe outcomes of a biased coin being flipped in multiple trials (Experiments 1-4). In all four experiments, counterfactual thought frequency mediated the relationship between task instructions and the extent of bias detection (i.e., learning). Experiment 5 showed that mental simulations of alternative outcomes were especially deleterious to learning and decision making. Findings are discussed in light of experiential learning theory and applied implications.

Pitfalls of counterfactual thinking in medical practice: preventing errors by using more functional reference points.

BACKGROUND: Counterfactual thinking involves mentally simulating alternatives to reality. The current article reviews literature pertaining to the relevance counterfactual thinking has for the quality of medical decision making. Although earlier counterfactual thought research concluded that counterfactuals have important benefits for the individual, there are reasons to believe that counterfactual thinking is also associated with dysfunctional consequences. Of particular focus is whether or not medical experience, and its influence on counterfactual thinking, actually informs or improves medical practice. It is hypothesized that relatively more probable decision alternatives, followed by undesirable outcomes and counterfactual thought responses, can be abandoned for relatively less probable decision alternatives. DESIGN AND METHODS: Building on earlier research demonstrating that counterfactual thinking can impede memory and learning in a decision paradigm with undergraduate students, the current study examines the extent to which earlier findings can be generalized to practicing physicians (N=10). Participants were asked to complete 60 trials of a computerized Monty Hall Problem simulation. Learning by experience was operationalized as the frequency of switch-decisions. RESULTS: Although some learning was evidenced by a general increase in switch-decision frequency across block trials, the extent of learning demonstrated was not ideal, nor practical. CONCLUSIONS: A simple, multiple-trial, decision paradigm demonstrated that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associations through experience. An agenda for future research, which tests the functionality of reference points (other than counterfactual alternatives) for the purposes of medical decision making, is proposed. Significance for public healthThe quality of healthcare depends heavily on the judgments and decisions made by doctors and other medical professionals. Findings from this research indicate that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associations through experience, as evidenced by the sample's tendency to select the optimal decision strategy in only 50% of 60 trials (each of which was followed by veridical feedback). These findings suggest that professional experience is unlikely to enhance the quality of medical decision making. Thus, this research has implications for understanding how doctors' reactions to medical outcomes shape their judgments and affect the degree to which their future treatment intentions are consistent with clinical practice guidelines. The current research is integrated with earlier research on counter-factual thinking, which appears to be a primary element inhibiting the learning of decision-outcome associations. An agenda for future research is proposed.

When ab ≠ c - c': published errors in the reports of single-mediator models.

Accurate reports of mediation analyses are critical to the assessment of inferences related to causality, since these inferences are consequential for both the evaluation of previous research (e.g., meta-analyses) and the progression of future research. However, upon reexamination, approximately 15% of published articles in psychology contain at least one incorrect statistical conclusion (Bakker & Wicherts, Behavior research methods, 43, 666-678 2011), disparities that beget the question of inaccuracy in mediation reports. To quantify this question of inaccuracy, articles reporting standard use of single-mediator models in three high-impact journals in personality and social psychology during 2011 were examined. More than 24% of the 156 models coded failed an equivalence test (i.e., ab = c - c'), suggesting that one or more regression coefficients in mediation analyses are frequently misreported. The authors cite common sources of errors, provide recommendations for enhanced accuracy in reports of single-mediator models, and discuss implications for alternative methods.

Prefactual potency: the perceived likelihood of alternatives to anticipated realities.

Prefactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements that represent mental simulations of alternatives to what is expected to occur in the future. The authors propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the prefactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the prefactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the influence of prefactuals. This construct, termed prefactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of prefactual thinking on judgments of anticipated negative affect. Through three experiments, the authors demonstrate the predictive power of this construct and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of prefactual thought. Implications of prefactual potency as a central factor of prefactual influence are discussed.

Learning inhibition in the Monty Hall problem: the role of dysfunctional counterfactual prescriptions.

Despite repeated trials, people consistently fail to learn the solution to the Monty Hall problem (MHP). This research examines the links between learning, counterfactual thinking, and memory for decision/outcome frequencies. Study 1 participants completed 60 MHP trials and listed their thoughts following losses. Results showed that participants tended to counterfactualize switch losses more than stick losses, adhered to the prescriptions of their counterfactuals more frequently following switch losses than any other decisions/outcomes, and were less likely to learn the solution as counterfactuals increased. Furthermore, memory for switch losses was significantly overestimated, and the relationship between counterfactuals and learning was mediated by misestimation of decision/outcome frequencies. In Study 2, counterfactual salience was manipulated. Learning was less likely to occur when counterfactual salience was high than when it was low, a relationship that was again mediated by memory of decision/outcome frequencies. Findings are discussed in light of their theoretical and applied implications.

Counterfactual potency.

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed.

Ease of counterfactual thought generation moderates the relationship between need for cognition and punitive responses to crime.

Punitive responses to crime have been linked to a relatively low need for cognition (NFC). Sargent's (2004) findings suggest that this relationship is due to a relatively complex attributional system, employed by high-NFC individuals, which permits them to recognize potential external or situational causes of crime. However, high-NFC individuals may also be more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking, which has been linked to greater judgments of blame and responsibility. Three studies examine the relationship between trait and state NFC and punitiveness in light of counterfactual thinking. Results suggest that the ease of generating upward counterfactuals in response to an unfortunate crime moderates the NFC-punitiveness relationship, such that high-NFC individuals are less punitive than low-NFC individuals only when counterfactual thoughts are relatively difficult to generate. These findings are discussed in light of punishment theory and their possible implications with regard to the legal system.

Attentional processes in stereotype formation: a common model for category accentuation and illusory correlation.

Stereotype formation may be based on the exaggeration of real group differences (category accentuation) or the misperception of group differences that do not exist (illusory correlation). This research sought to account for both phenomena with J. K. Kruschke's (1996, 2001, 2003) attention theory of category learning. According to the model, the features of majority groups are learned earlier than the features of minority groups. In turn, the features that become associated with a minority are those that most distinguish it from the majority. This second process is driven by an attention-shifting mechanism that directs attention toward group-attribute pairings that facilitate differentiation of the two groups and may lead to the formation of stronger minority stereotypes. Five experiments supported this model as a common account for category accentuation and distinctiveness-based illusory correlation. Implications for the natures of stereotype formation, illusory correlation, and impression formation are discussed.

Psychophysiological response patterns and risky sexual behavior in heterosexual and homosexual men.

The past few years have seen an increased awareness of the relevance of studying the role of sexual response, emotion, and traits such as sensation seeking and the propensity for sexual inhibition in risky sexual behavior. The current study examined the association between self-reported sexual risk taking and psychophysiological response patterns in 76 heterosexual and homosexual men. Measures included genital, electrodermal, startle eyeblink, and cardiovascular responses, and stimuli included threatening (depicting coercive sexual interactions) and nonthreatening (depicting consensual sexual interactions) sexual film excerpts. Sexual risk taking was hypothesized to be associated with decreased inhibition of sexual arousal and hyporeactive affective and autonomic responses to threatening sexual stimuli. Controlling for age and number of sexual partners in the past year, sexual risk taking (number of partners during the past 3 years with whom no condoms were used) was found to be associated with stronger genital responses and smaller eyeblink responses to both threatening and nonthreatening sexual stimuli. Correlations between genital and subjective sexual arousal were relatively low. Sexual risk taking was related to sensation seeking but not to the propensity for sexual inhibition. The findings suggest that risky sexual behavior may involve a role for psychophysiological mechanisms that are specific to sex as well as for ones that are associated with more general approach/avoidance response tendencies.

Unpacking attitude certainty: attitude clarity and attitude correctness.

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what one's attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that one's attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive messages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.

Who I am, who we are, and why: links between emotions and causal attributions for self- and group discrepancies.

Discrepancies between people's ought selves and their actual selves and their ideal selves and actual selves predict the emotions that individuals experience. The authors predicted that internal versus external causal attributions for self-discrepancies should moderate the relationship between self-discrepancies and emotions, resulting in more refined predictions for both agitation- and dejection-related emotions and for two additional types of emotion, namely, anger-related and discontent-related emotions. Results of two studies generally supported the predictions that agitation-related emotions and dejection-related emotions were positively associated with actual-ought discrepancies and actual-ideal discrepancies, respectively, only when causal attributions for the discrepancies were internally based. Anger-related emotions and emotions of discontent were positively associated with actual-ought and actual-ideal discrepancies, respectively, primarily when causal attributions were externally based. Study 2, which addressed group discrepancies and group-based emotions, generally replicated the findings when group identification was high, yielding a more complex model of the link between discrepancies and emotions.

Factor validation of the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale: evidence for a short version.

The author examined the factor structure of the 12-item Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale (A. Strathman, F. Gleicher, D. S. Boninger, & S. Edwards, 1994) among 664 undergraduate university students enrolled in human development courses. A principal-components factor analysis with varimax rotation yielded 2 factors. The author used confirmatory factor analysis procedures to examine the fit of 4 models, according to the principal-components factor analysis findings, with the observed covariance. The author used a number of fit indices to compare the 4 models. Both sets of analysis provided the greatest support for an 8-item short version of the CFC Scale. The author discussed findings in regard to the CFC Scale as an instrument to measure future time perspective.